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The Human Rights Civil Society
Social Powerlessness and the Quest for Political Legitimacy
Dominique Connan
1 The  2007  General  Elections  in  Kenya  and  the  subsequent  crisis  badly  damaged  the
country’s  international  reputation,  which had been economically flourishing,  towards
democratisation within a  strong civil  society.  At  a  moment  when the  jolts  from the
political  crisis have dissolved the myths and illusions from this exported image,  it  is
important to reflect on one of its major bases: the Kenyan “civil society” that is often
described  as  a  solid  rampart  against  the  demons  of  authoritarianism,  violence  and
tribalism. A definition of this civil society is required as an initial step towards studying
it. It has very blurred outlines, whose ambiguous term of “civil society” bears whatever
meaning the speaker wishes to give it.1 It will be defined here as a collection of associated
bodies  that  recognise  the  State  as  a  monopoly  of  political  power,  while  playing  an
influential and critical role towards it. It is within this framework that this definition
stops  at  an  Anglophone,  secular  human  rights  civil  society  in  Kenya.  Religious
institutions, particularly churches, which play an important role within civil society, are
not included in this definition.2 What will be broached here is the issue of militia and of
“militarized” groups that can be termed ethnic in terms of their relationship with the
State, depending mainly on their areas of operation. The latter are often an ambiguous
group that cannot easily be integrated within a reflection of “civil society.” As armed
organizations, the groups do not acknowledge the State as the monopoly for legitimate
violence. This chapter will therefore limit itself to an evaluation of what influence the
human rights civil society could have vis-à-vis these militia, who have often been the
operators of post-electoral violence.
2 This arbitrary choice of only considering human rights organisations is justified by the
facts: the flag bearer of first, multipartyism then secondly, of constitutional reform since
the beginning of the 1990s,  this sector of  civil  society and the individuals in it  were
singled out  during the electoral  process  and political  mediations which followed the
electoral irregularities. In addition to the justification of these events, they were the only
organisations that could be studied from journalistic sources.3 The intention here is not
to draw up an exhaustive list of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that played a
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role in the electoral process and its outcome. A modest attempt has been made to isolate
the most outstanding examples, as well as various strategies unique to these actors in the
context of the crisis that perturbed Kenya at the start of 2008. In order to understand the
specific configuration of the 2007 General Elections and their challenges for civil society,
a brief historical framework is required, bearing in mind that the civil society has barely
found  its  place  in  the  political  chessboard  since  2002.  The  chapter  will  pose  some
elements  for  reflection  on  the  tactics  aimed  at  making  these  organisations  and
individuals legitimate actors of the process to find a way out of the crisis. In conclusion,
the paper broaches the issues that created this new configuration—the issues renewed as
concerns the civil society in politics, of its independence from leaders and parties, and in
fine, of its representation.
 
Constitutional reform since 1997, a vehicle for
structuring the civil society
3 What is referred to as the human rights civil society is a recent phenomenon in Kenya. Its
emergence as an influential force dates back to the end of the 1990s. Since then, it has
adopted an equivocal  attitude  towards  the  government  in  power.  Making a  plea  for
political openness in 1997, the civil society greatly contributed to the victory of Mwai
Kibaki in the presidential elections of 2002. However, the hopes for change brought about
by the new regime were soon disabused. The failure of the constitutional reform process
is symbolic of this disappointment more so as it had been the society’s battle horse since
the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the 2005 referendum allowed the civil society to once
again take up its official recognition, first as an electoral observation force. The 2007
elections allowed continuity for the process of recomposing the role of the associations
for civil rights protection.
 
Constitution and eviction of a social front for a political opening
(1994–1997)
4 From 1994, the Law Society of Kenya, the International Commission of Jurists (Kenyan
Chapter)  and the Kenya Human Rights Commission introduced a Constitution project
within which they defended a pluralist and democratic system. Indeed, it was only then
that Daniel  arap Moi’s  regime agreed to repeal  Section 2A of  the Constitution which
instituted a single-party system, but this was merely a formality: the President still held
considerable discretionary powers and a control of a repressive machine in terms of an
authoritarian State. Although mainly emanating from professional lawyer organizations,
this proposal was discussed and defended within a much larger scope. It soon acquired
the support of major Christian organizations. A few politicians, among whom was Raila
Odinga, also lent their support to this initiative. These diverse groups thus united as the
Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (also referred to as the “4Cs”), and succeeded
in  persuading  D.  arap  Moi  to  include  constitutional  reform  in  his  political  agenda.
Additionally,  the creation of  an umbrella organization gave them an opportunity for
foreign funding. This body was eventually confronted with a dilemma that it still faces
today—the lawyer-based organisations were the only ones who could take pride in an
alternative  representation  from the  professional  circle  to  which  they  belonged.  The
support of  the churches to these demands,  however,  gave them a broad reach going
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beyond the Anglophone urban centres where they had been expressed. But these NGOs
had other needs—the formation of a social base of influence on the prevailing authorities;
and the support of politicians whose priority was not so much the establishment of a
democratic system in itself as the conquest of political power.4 This ambiguous position
towards  the  opposition culminated in  1997,  while  the  forthcoming General  Elections
converged the agenda of both the civil society and of the dissident politicians within the
ruling party, KANU.5
5 In early 1997, a National Convention was held, bringing together the three large bodies
that criticized the Moi regime—NGOs, churches and opposition parties, with variations in
the level of involvement of each of them.6 The National Convention Executive Council,
NCEC, gave President Moi an ultimatum, asking him to initiate constitutional reforms. At
the same time, Protestant and Catholic churches7 met the President several times in order
to compel him to launch an agenda of political openness. In view of the failure of these
negotiations,  the  churches  also  gave  an  ultimatum to  the  head  of  State.  These  two
deadlines  were not  respected.  Both the NCEC and the churches  found themselves  in
agreement and together called for demonstrations.8 While D.  arap Moi  desisted from
brutally  repressing  them,  they  were  able  to  meet  all  opposition,  political  and social
movements,  under a  single  reform banner.  Ultimately,  these events  were as  much a
popular success as a political failure since they were not followed by any tangible effects.
6 The demands of the NGOs were relayed to Parliament while the opposition MPs agreed to
vote on the budget, on condition of legal reforms. The revolt by these MPs threatened to
render the county ungovernable. Similarly, the NGOs, increasingly egged on by donors,
undertook massive civic education work in order to sensitize the masses on the need for
reform of the regime. Fresh demonstrations were organized at the beginning of July 1997.
This time around,  they were ferociously repressed,  but it  led to an enlarged rank of
reformists. In order to break this formidable alliance, D. arap Moi opted to negotiate with
some of its members. He attacked the weakest links within this coalition, by initiating
negotiations with the churches and the most influential members of the opposition. NGOs
were excluded on the grounds of their lack of representation. Although these initiatives
were not succeeded by serious measures, they hastened the split of the reformist front.
This change in the president’s tactics led to the radicalization of the non-religious civil
society.  The  NCEC  threatened  to  declare  the  National  Convention  constituent  if
substantial reforms were not taken before the General Elections in December. However,
in  the  meantime,  opposition  MPs  chose  to  directly  negotiate  with  their  KANU
counterparts. This process resulted in the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group—IPPG. This
informal  agreement engaged its  parties,  or  hundreds of  its  MPs from all  quarters to
advocate for wide-scale reforms:  independence of  the Electoral  Commission of  Kenya
(ECK), whose members would be nominated in equal parts by the ruling party and by the
opposition; the repealing of repressive laws; equal media coverage by the governmental
media;  and the setting up of  a  Commission for  Constitutional  Reform.  Although this
agreement initially was lacking approval, it severely reduced the civil society’s capacity
to mobilize. The co-opting of their demands by a political class in full fighting form gear
alienated the associations from the political scene.9 Despite the disqualification of the
NGOs present, their pressure sped up the inclusion of legal and constitutional reforms on
the political agenda.10 Nevertheless, the measures presented by the IPPG were subjected
to a law which kept barely a third of the proposals of the agreement. It was voted upon
just before the dissolution of Parliament, towards the end of 1997, while D. arap Moi
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announced the General Elections for December. Making fun of an opposition that the IPPG
had made into a laughing- stock, Moi was once again in a position to get rid of them.
 
From a political lobby to an electoral watchdog (1997–2005)
7 After his victory in December 1997, D. arap Moi appointed a Commission to negotiate
constitutional reforms, in accordance with the IPPG proposals. This Commission, named
after its chairman Yash Pal Ghai, succeeded in bringing together a considerable portion of
the country’s social forces. This gave it (the Ghai Commission) a level of legitimacy. It was
also a means for D. arap Moi to defuse the mobilizing capacities that the secular civil
society had displayed in 1997.11 Delayed several times in its work by an executive power
that wished to have control over the reform process, the Ghai Commission delivered a
proposed Constitution just before the 2002 General Elections. This blew the wind out of
the civil society’s sails, which was still mainly composed of jurist associations, and it was
hence  marginalized  in  the  electoral  campaign.  Nevertheless  the  society  earned  an
indirect victory, with the budding NARC (National Rainbow Coalition)12 taking up several
suggestions into its programme. These associations still defend the programmes—human
rights, civil freedom and the establishment of counter powers—to date. These demands
served  to  cement  an  irregular  NARC  coalition  that  required  such  a  programme  to
neutralize the dissidents within it.13 Finally, the Ghai Commission allowed the civil society
to  mutate  in  its  role,  one  that  would  transform the  jurist  associations  into  political
lobbies.
8 After M. Kibaki’s victory in the Presidential election, an assembly of delegates comprising
parliamentarians and District representatives came together to debate on the findings of
the  Ghai  Commission.  These  discussions,  “the  Bomas  meetings,”  emphasised  the
transformation of the civil society associations into pressure groups. New themes then
emerged  on  the  political  scene,  for  example  women’s  rights.  However,  the  debates
polarized  the  government  and  hastened  the  death  throes  of  NARC’s  already  fragile
electoral coalition. Actually, many of M. Kibaki’s former fellow travelers14 were uneasy
about granting a constitutional reform which would weaken their power. They slowed
down the  negotiations  as  far  as  they  could,  through manoeuvres  that  affected their
popularity.  Only  the  NDP15 faction of  the  government,  led  by  R.  Odinga,  wanted the
reforms to  succeed.  These  reforms would have  given their  leader  the  post  of  Prime
Minister, as had been promised in the Memorandum of Understanding signed between all
the parties within NARC before the elections. Because of this, the constitutional reform
process, which initially resulted in major popular consultations, was largely amended by
the prevailing authorities. This was done at the risk of losing all legitimacy.16 In order to
counter this, M. Kibaki decided to submit the constitutional reforms to a referendum.
9 The referendum campaign was decisive in recomposing the role of civil society. Having
been the battle  horse of  the NGOs since the beginning of  the 1990s,  the NGOs were
particularly concerned by the failure of the constitutional reform process. Although they
had been paralyzed during the 2002 elections, the referendum forced the civil society to
play, at the very least, a role of critical observer. Therefore, the referendum took on an
existential  bearing  to  some  extent  for  many  organisations.  This  was  also  their
opportunity  for  the  NGOs  to  reposition  themselves  as  legitimate  actors  of  political
reforms.  Exasperated by the authorities’  reluctance to concede to reforms,  the NGOs
undertook  sensitization  measures  geared  towards  the  voters’  stakes  and  actions.17 A
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preliminary civic education programme was organized for the public. Additionally, the
NGOs created election watchdog groups. Several umbrella organisations and networks
were created whose aim was to observe the voting process.18 The fears of electoral fraud
were proved hence true, while the referendum campaign was shaken by the return of
clientilistic practices of previous regimes.19 This was the perfect moment for united front,
comprising  NGOs  attached  to  human  rights.  With  the  inspection  of  about  40
constituencies, these initiatives were a success as attested by the collapse of M. Kibaki
and his allies.
 
The Kenyan civil society and the 2007 general
elections: challenges of electoral observation
10 The experience of the referendum indicated the end of the transition begun by the Bomas
meetings.  Several  professional  went  beyond  judicial  role  that  had  hitherto  been
attributed to them. The constitutional reform process sped up its progress to a more
active and transversal role of criticizing the actions of the regime. The 2005 referendum
finally accorded them a new position in the electoral process. The 2007 general elections
were, for the civil society, continuity of the referendum process.
 
Economic mobilisation factors of the civil society
11 The vigilance of the NGOs was motivated by several exogenous factors during the voting.
On the  one  hand,  the  Electoral  Commission  of  Kenya  (ECK)  debated  upon since  the
beginning of multipartyism, had always been accused of partiality, as it Chairman and 20
Commissioners were appointed by the President. Several organisations asked, in vain, for
its transformation into an independent administrative and financially autonomous body.
The provincial administration, which traditionally campaigned for the Executive, were
another cause for anxiety. Indeed, it appeared that the police force was dedicated to it,
the ruling Administrative Police (AP) had received considerable reinforcements and new
equipment in the months preceding the elections. Bypassing the regular hierarchy of the
Kenyan police force, the AP, under direct orders from the President, aroused suspicions
as to their integrity and those whom they served. The simultaneous decrease in human
and financial resources of the General Service Unit20 only added to these doubts. On the
other hand, the brutal repression of the Mungiki sect in the mid-2007 was marked by
several extrajudicial executions. The Kenya Human Rights Commission later revealed the
existence of  several  graves,  containing about 500 bodies.21 This discovery elicited the
distrust of associations concerning police brutality, which the Kibaki regime engaged in.
The  NGOs’  attention  finally  focused  on  the  partisan  bodies.  The  Orange  Democratic
Movement (ODM) was only formed in 2005, the Party of National Unity (PNU) was an
electoral creation of M. Kibaki. The latter only saw the light of day in the election year.
Moreover,  these  parties  took  the  form  of  coalitions,  which  necessitated  a  primary
selection of local candidates within the groups. The institutional weakness of the parties
and  the  fluidity  of  their  hierarchies  resulted  in  control  of  the  nomination  of  the
parliamentary candidates from the two main political parties.
12 Organised in networks of several associations,  the civil  society evaluated the election
process and the party primaries upto the announcement of the results by the ECK. Under
surveillance were the education of citizens, media integrity, violence and the behaviour
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of the police. More concentrated on observation of the process than on mobilisation of
the masses, the NGOs played the role of expert rather than militia. The Kenya Human
Rights Commission is particularly symbolic of this phenomenon. It recruited its members
in  the  1990s,  drawing  from  exiled  academics  and  political  prisoners.  Such  personal
characteristics were in the line with the demands of an organisation that was fighting for
democratic space from the regime.22 During the General Elections of 2007, it displayed
itself more as a research and political analysis organisation. Essentially a defender of
human rights, it had a more passive role as guardian of the principles of political plurality
and electoral justice.
 
The virtues and vices of a local electoral observation
13 Symbolic of this desire for control of the entire electoral process, the secular Kenyan civil
society and the churches came together within the Kenya Elections Domestic Observation
Forum—KEDOF.23 Two months before the election,  they hurriedly sent  out  about  450
observers  to  the  210  constituencies  of  the  country,  whose  mission was  to  report  all
anomalies relative to political parties, gatherings and pre-electoral violence. Finally, on
the day of the voting, 17,000 observers descended on almost 20,000 voting stations to
inspect the election process.24 It is likely the scope of this mission that enabled one of the
coordinators,  Koki  Muli,  to  get  accreditation  by  the  ECK  on  the  night  of  29  to
30 December, in order to verify the integrity of the counting process held at the Kenyatta
International Conference Centre, KICC.25 Because of this, although the network attested to
the credibility of the voting process in majority of the voting offices, they contributed to
questioning the ECK in the detailed accounting of votes, which were judged fraudulent.
14 At the end of  the day,  these electoral  observation initiatives revealed their sanction,
along with foreign organisations.  Despite  having been invited and accredited by  the
government, electoral observers contradicted the authorities, and there is the risk that
they may be excluded from subsequent electoral processes. And even if these observers
took the risk of criticizing the election process, their conclusions were not followed by
action. However, these observations eventually served as the basis for a petition, and this
strengthened  the  opposition  in  officially  contesting  the  results  without  offering  an
alternative. Until this time, election observers only had to confirm major victories since
the  beginning  of  multipartyism in  1992.  From a  functional  point  of  view,  observers
contributed to increasing the legitimacy of the victor by attesting to the regularity of his
ascension to power conforming to imported democratic standards. The 2007 elections
posed the new problem of a highly contested poll, with an uncertain result. This time
around, the civil society had to ratify a political crisis, without even having the means to
advance a solution to this state of affairs. In the final analysis, the normative standards of
the  observers  should  be  put  to  task.  It  has  since  been admitted that,  in  Kenya,  the
legitimacy of leaders was historically built on a clientilistic and patrimonial base. There is
now room to interrogate the relevance of the electoral norms advocated by the civil
society. The players and the referee were not playing to the same rules. Hence, legitimacy
of political leaders is the fruit of a weak institutionalization of State power, what comes to
light is a perverse effect of electoral observation: the financing of these operations by
foreign donors created an eviction effect that sanctions public institutions, which are
normally dedicated to the surveillance of the elections.  The money given to the civil
society did not contribute to the development of the administration, but more to the
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“privatisation” of state functions. Evidently, the civil society’s adoption of the electoral
standards given by the international institutions is a main source of extroversion, which
contributed to a collection of resources, this resulting in a huge personnel base. As a
confirmation,  it  allowed  the  civil  society—whose  representation  is  questionable—to
morph into a legitimate actor on a political scene, whom it would be naïve to consider as
being neutral. The crisis which followed the elections tended to confirm this view.
 
Peace with or without justice: a divided civil society
15 The crisis, initiated by strong suspicions of voting irregularities, brought the presidential
team back to back with litigation and an opposition that could also have been accused of
electoral fraud. As large portions of the country plunged into violence, the legitimate
political representatives were unclear. Under these circumstances, then, the civil society
seemed to be an ideal mediator. However, this situation greatly polarized: there was a
clear  pacifist  faction which considered a  return to  calm as  preferable  to  respect  for
democratic principles and the opposition’s political expression. Opposing this, a camp
regrouped under the banner of upholding democratic principles. This latter insisted that
a  return  to  calm  would  only  be  sustainable  if  the  government  agreed  to  respect
democracy and to resolve various latent social problems. Top of these challenges was the
redistribution of land and economic resources, and a constitutional reform specifically
geared to balance Executive Powers. This split often marked the border between secular
groups  and the  churches.  Divided by  this  conflict  in  interpretation,  the  civil  society
organisations  were  in  a  competition  whose  challenge  was  to  find  the  legitimate
representation of the crisis.
 
Polarisation of the civil society
16 The political  crisis  deeply divided the Anglophone civil  society.  Each of  these camps
claimed to play a role in the negotiations between the two political parties. The first
group that can be distinguished is the organisations that consider peace as a priority in
the resolution of the electoral differences. For this group, it didn’t matter much who won,
as long as the violence ended and the country was united. Along with the evidence that
the sympathisers of M. Kibaki and the PNU brought forward, this faction also had a strong
Christian tone. Specifically, it should be noted that the Anglican and Catholic churches of
Kenya  campaigned  in  favor  of  M.  Kibaki,  and  acted  as  a  relay  for  him  during  the
campaign. This situation was intensified by the alliance made between R. Odinga and the
Muslim communities.26
17 The most notable personality of the pacifist group was Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat. A
specialist in conflict resolution with more than 20 years experience, he had presided over
negotiations  during  the  Ugandan  conflict  in  1985–1986;  he  led  a  team  on  conflict
resolution in Mozambique in 1988–1992, until he became Kenya’s special envoy for the
peace  process  in  Somalia.  Currently,  he  is  the  director  of  the  African Peace  Forum,
member  of  the  International  Crisis  Group  and  Permanent  Secretary  in  the  Kenyan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Renown for peace in Africa, his message has deep Christian
undertones.  B.  Kiplagat  faces  the  crisis  from the  view of  God’s  creation rather  than
antagonistic interests. His assessment of the situation is that it is a result of sin and that
there would be public prayer, forgiveness and reconciliation.27 In his wake, several ad hoc
The Human Rights Civil Society
Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review, 38 | 2008
7
organisations became heralds of unconditional peace. An example of this is the “Heal the
Nation” campaign that organised a deposit of flowers for peace in the City Centre. All
these movements had ostensible political sympathies. At the beginning of February, B.
Kiplagat led a delegation of Concerned Citizens for Peace to distribute water, food and
telephone calling cards to the anti-riot police stationed at Uhuru Park.28 This latter were
charged with preventing access to the park and thus any political demonstrations. The
same goes for Maendeleo ya Wanawake,  which led female processions entreating the
belligerents to bury the hatchet. They did this at the St Paul’s Cathedral in Nairobi. These
group processions were then in tandem with the Catholic priests on injunctions to the
government against using security forces to restore order and bring an end to human
suffering.29
18 These  appeals  for  unconditional  peace  resonated  with  those  of  several  other
organisations whose interest was in a cessation of violence, albeit to the detriment of a
political solution. Numerous hotel and tourist associations, and especially professional
and business associations were a part of it.30 The Coast Kenya Association of Hotelkeepers
estimated that  several  hotels  at  the  Coast  and about  20,000  people  were  technically
unemployed as a result of the post electoral situation.31 Banks, together with churches and
the  government  media,  published  peace  appeals  in  the  press.32 This  shows  that  the
majority of churches and several business associations, in their unconditional appeal to
peace, were allies of the Kibaki regime.
19 Parallel to this pacifist civil society, a faction of organisations defending electoral justice
and critical of M. Kibaki’s civil “coup d’État” was organised. The first to make known their
rejection of the results announced by the electoral commission was the Law Society of
Kenya—LSK. It contested the validity of the results the morning after the election and
rapidly  suggested  the  setting  up  of  a  transition  government  in  order  to  plan  new
elections. This jurists’ organisation lay violent charges against the electoral commission.
They demanded that the commission be relieved of their duties and that an independent
body takes over the organisation of elections in the constituencies where the results had
been cancelled.33 Finally, its vision of the crisis was much more political than that of the
pacifist organizations. The LSK supported the crisis resolution process led by Kofi Annan,
but nevertheless called for a solution based on power-sharing with the creation of the
post of Prime Minister with executive powers. Thus, it once again took up its battle horse
of the 1990s, by calling for the adoption of the initial constitutional reform proposals, the
Bomas Draft, which emanated from popular consultations. The demands of the Kenyan
Chapter of the International Commission of Jurists—ICJ, were of a similar nature. The
impasse in which the country found itself was resolved in the law, from where all power
emanated. In January, the ICJ demanded the creation of an interim government, based on
a coalition principle, to be led by civil servants and technocrats. Its mandate would be to
stabilize the country and solve the problem of the internally displaced persons. They
launched a verbal attack on the ECK, which despite what its Chairman claimed still had
the power to cancel the elections. The Constitution actually provided that all constituted
bodies had the power to cancel its own acts. For the LSK and the ICJ, just like for many
other secular jurist organisations, the crisis was the proof that constitutional reform that
would limit the powers of the Executive was urgently needed. The situation demanded
not just a temporary political regulation but a complete overhaul of the juridical system
for the country, and a new social contract with Kenyans.34
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20 In January, a lobby comprising about 30 Kenyan organisations was created, focusing on a
demand for unconditional civil peace. There was a large variety of associations in this
group:  jurist  organisations  such  as  ICJ,  LSK,  Kituo  Cha  Sheria  and  East  African  Law
Society; human rights protection lobbies such as the Kenya Human Rights Commission;
and development organizations such as Mazingira Institute. Led by the IED, the electoral
observation unit of KEDOF was also included. The Kenya National Commission on Human
Rights took over the leadership of this group, under the collective name of Kenyans for
Peace with Truth and Justice—KPTJ.
21 The political position of the leaders of these organisations was quite similar. They first
supported the declarations of the KEDOF observers who had recorded electoral fraud
during the vote counting process on 30 December 2007.35 K. Muli, of the IED, declared to
the press that the 2007 elections had the makings of a “coup d’État” and that it was a
disastrous day for Kenyan democracy.36 Maina Kiai, head of the KNCHR, agreed with this
assertion, in the months prior to the elections, the KNCHR had warned of possible fraud
by a biased electoral commission.37
22 The KNCHR is a public institution, legally established by law in 2002 as an independent
commission charged with the protection of human rights in the country. Since 2003, the
commission has been headed by M. Kiai, an extremely active militant and a lawyer by
profession.  Before  taking  up  this  position, he  founded  the  Kenya  Human  Rights
Commission in 1992, and was its Director until 1998. He actively participated in the battle
for constitutional reform in the 1990s, within the 4Cs, which at that time was in the NCEC.
He was then appointed Director of the Secretariat of Amnesty International in London. He
held this position for three years before becoming the Director of African Programmes of
an American NGO, the International Human Rights Law Group. This is a foundation that
develops financing and cooperation programmes with national human rights protection
groups. He was the main actor of the lobbying led by KPTJ in the post-electoral crisis. His
position as chairman of a public institution, going by his past as a militant jurist, made
him one of the most legitimate actors on the national scene and a person with whom
international institutions and mediators had a special relationship. He played a crucial
role  in  the  conflict  between  NGOs  on  the  definition  of  the  crisis,  as  well  as  in  the
unacceptability of a fraudulently elected President.
23 Finally,  several  other groups led initiatives  aimed at  the protection of  human rights
which were threatened by a politically explosive situation. This resulted in the Amani
groups. Amani Mashinani Initiative is a union of Kenyan associations for the protection of
human rights. It is mostly established in informal residential settlements of the country.
The  groups  distributed  humanitarian  aid  and  held  reconciliation  meetings  aimed  at
uniting local political leaders. Additionally, Amani Focus attempted to organise tours by
the political leaders to the violence-prone areas, so that they could spread a message of
peaceful resolution to the conflict.38
 
Crisis caused by a repeat of the voting: the KPTJ and criminalisation
of the ECK
24 The KNCHR stands out by its assertion of independence from the government. Before the
election, the commission had been requested by the government to draw up a report on
violence and human rights violations during the campaign period. At the beginning of
January,  the government,  through its  spokesman Alfred Mutua,  detained this  report.
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They zeroed in on the issues that could result in getting R. Odinga’s ODM charged before
the International Crime Tribunal in the Hague. The government accused ODM of “ethnic
cleansing” and  of  having  premeditated  and  precipitated  violence  that  resulted  in
hundreds of deaths in the Rift Valley and the western parts of the country. In reality,
these  were  old  accusations,  rooted  in  the  controversy  during  the  campaigns  that
accompanied the majimbo debate. M. Kibaki’s camp had accused the ODM of stirring up
ethnic cleansing under the guise of regionalism.39 From the moment that the electoral
rigging plunged the country into violence, faced with police repression, the ODM was the
first to accuse the government of “ethnic cleansing.” This accusation probably sped up
the involvement of the international community in the crisis resolution. However, both
the presidential camp and the opposition continued in mutual accusation of these crimes,
consequently resulting in the terms “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” constituting a
repertoire of widely recognized terms.40
25 The  KNCHR  refused  to  present  its  report  to  the  government,  which it  considered
illegitimate, and said they would only settle the score in Parliament. Additionally, the
spokesman of the KNCHR announced that the commission had decided to inquire into
extrajudiciary  executions  committed  by  the  police  and  security  forces  during  the
repression of riots and demonstrations. In the election observation report was presented
in mid-January,  the  commission stressed on the  irregularities  throughout  the  voting
process, assessing the rigging in favor of M. Kibaki at more than 450,000 votes. This was
followed by an attack against the international organisation Human Rights Watch, that
published  a  report  stating  that  the  post-electoral  violence  had  been  organized  and
premeditated by the ODM.41 The KNHRC, which can pride itself on having a large body of
international experts at its disposal,  led a counter inquiry in a majority of the towns
affected by violence, in Kericho, Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu, Kakamega and Kitale.42
26 At the beginning of January, Kenyans for Peace, Truth Justice (KPTJ) come up with a brief
manifesto recognising the peace efforts led by the churches,  but attributed the main
cause of the crisis to a rigged election.43 It also denounced police brutality as equal to the
atrocities of the militia and political violence. The group openly declared that it did not
recognise M.  Kibaki  as  head of  the Kenyan government,  and asked the international
community to do the same. By mid-January, the group had become more radical in the
face of the unconditional pacifists who threatened to bury democracy in the name of
security. As a reaction, it changed its name to Kenyans for Peace, with Truth and Justice.
It made use of KNCHR conclusions in a much more explicitly militant manner. At the end
of January, it published a report titled Countdown to deception: 30 hours that destroyed
Kenya, in which a blow-by-blow account of the entire fraud committed by the ECK was
given. Consequently, the KPTJ demanded that S. Kivuitu, along with his 21 commissioners
be charged in court. In addition to this, the NGOs prepared a document listing all the
issues that they blamed the commission for, amounting to several crimes. This was aimed
at ensuring that  negotiations for real  constitutional  reforms returned to the agenda,
which guaranteed the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. Basically,
the violence and the impasse in which the country was in were only the outcome of a
reform process that has been delayed too long. These initiatives to sue Kibaki’s regime
and to place constitutional reforms on the agenda largely dominated the political scene.
27 However, apart from accusing the ECK, the organisations for the protection of human
rights were careful  about attributing responsibility for the violence.  It  appeared that
dialogue would be the only means to resolve the crisis and it therefore seemed imprudent
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to blame one camp more than the other. Several times, leaders such as M. Kiai suggested
that the situation was only a result of the latent conflict that had eroded the country
since the beginning of the 1990s—the militia had not been disarmed; land conflicts had
not been resolved. In order to allocate responsibility for the violence, the organisations
called for the setting up of an independent international commission. They were vary of
supporting the demonstrations organised by ODM, for fear of deadly outbursts.44
 
Attacks and counter-attacks: survival stratégies and
political positioning of the civil society
28 In its undertaking for a postponement of the regime’s reform agenda, the secular civil
society initially came up against counter-attacks from M. Kibaki’s team. Several of its
(civil  society)  most  eminent  representatives  were  threatened.  However,  the
commencement of round of talks under the guidance of K. Annan opened up an arena in
which the civil society could be reconstituted as a legitimate and credible intervener.
 
The government camp—caught between response and repression
29 At the beginning of January, the ODM appealed to its supporters through the press to
stage a huge demonstration against the “stolen” elections. The government responded,
through  the  press  as  well,  insisting  on  the  illegality  of  political  gatherings  and
emphasizing the regularity of the vote. Peculiarly, the sympathisers of M. Kibaki often
attempted to  mimic  the  announcements  of  the  civil  society  in  order  to  counter  the
mobilisation calls  launched by the opposition.  This  saw the publishing of  a  series  of
announcements  signed  by  the  Kenyans  for  Peace  and  Progress,  an  association  with
neither address nor location, which claimed to be founded on the eternal principals of
democracy,  honesty,  truth  and  justice. The  announcements,  running  on  two  full
newspaper pages, depolitised the stakes of the demonstrations in a paternalistic tone,
basing its argument on the misfortunes of the ordinary Kenyan, victim of the opposition’s
political maneuvering. Emphasising the worthlessness of demonstrations and the number
of  violence  victims,  the  adverts  then published an  inventory  of  the  MPs’  privileges:
salaries, official vehicles, exorbitant bonuses. The group postulated that the MPs would
never send their  children to risk their  lives in such ventures,  concluding,  “Say no to
unlawful political activities that will not feed, clothe, or educate your family.”45 Kenyans were
referred  to  their  disillusions,  their  own  misery  and  the  powerlessness  of  political
mobilisations in the resolving of daily challenges. This phenomenon indicated that the
civil society and its modes of expression were taken seriously by the government camp,
which in turn launched whitewashing tricks in the media to counter these messages.
30 Playing their classical card of intimidation, the M. Kibaki camp attacked leaders who
challenged the validity of his re-election. Consequently, the Nobel Prize winner, Wangari
Maathai, having been defeated in her quest for the Tetu Constituency parliamentary seat,
raised her voice even louder as she ran no political risk. Contesting the validity of the
governmental Peace and Reconciliation Commission nominated by M. Kibaki and headed
by Vice-President Kalonzo Musyoka, she declared that the chaos was the result of the
President’s policies that had been carried out since 2002.46 Apart from this she demanded
that the government be held accountable for the victims of violence and the destruction,
criticising its incapability to protect Kenyan citizens.47 The very next day, the bodyguards
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that  she had had since winning the Nobel  Prize,  were withdrawn.48 Also  affected by
governmental intimidation was M. Kiai, for whom pressure from the authorities was not a
new experience. Fearing for his life, he was obliged to temporarily flee the country.49 In
September 2006,  his  criticism  of  the  government  resulted  in  his  being  accused  of
corruption and nepotism, in his position as chairman of the KNHRC. The intimidation of
critics of Kibaki regime was child’s play to the supporters.
 
Extroversion and response of the political scene
31 The start of negotiations for an exit from the crisis led by K. Annan obliged the civil
society to play the role of legitimate actor in a new setup. Although having the de facto
role of the opposition by challenging M. Kibaki’s legitimacy, it  (the civil  society) was
consulted as a neutral player before beginning of the talks.  However,  it  is mainly by
intense lobbying abroad that these associations, headed by KNHRC, were able to impose
their point of view on the negotiators in setting the agenda for an end to the crisis. These
international homologation techniques towards a local official recognition revealed local
extroversion strategies.50 In mid-January, M. Kiai presented himself at the African Union
conference, where the situation in Kenya was high on the agenda, in order to bring forth
his views and to block the presence of Kibaki who intended to crown himself Head of
State. He then hurriedly dispatched a team from the KNHRC on a European tour: first to
Geneva, in order to alert the United Nations on the violations of human rights that the
Kenyan police were accused of.51 Then, it was off to England to discuss the situation with
Lord Malloch-Brown, the British Minister of African Affairs, who K. Musyoka was also to
meet. The final point of this tour was M. Kiai’s address to the American Congress. Invited
by the Committee for Africa and World Health, he gave assessment of this situation, the
political, social and legal crisis, focusing on these more than genocide or ethnic cleansing.
On these grounds, he asked the United States to freeze all military aid and trade with
Kenya,  until  an  interim government  was  formed.  He  opportunely  requested  that  all
humanitarian aid be channeled through NGOs rather than State organs. Finally, he called
for an independent foreign investigation on the results of the presidential election. His
demands were taken up by the Democrats in Congress. It is significant that the very same
week, the US Secretary for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, came up with the notion that M.
Kibaki’s camp might be victims of ethnic cleansing.52 This was the perfect opportunity for
the Democrats to use the baton that M. Kiai had offered them, to fight the Republicans
with.
32 Thus armed with the approval of many high-ranking foreign representatives, M. Kiai and
the KNCHR representatives coalesced into a pressure group of the Kofi Annan negotiation
team. In the absence of strong social  support in Kenya,  they managed to put on the
agenda  several  problems  that  the  government  would  have  preferred  to  avoid.  The
international ratification, facilitated by the professional biography of its main broker,
thus  served  as  an  internal  official  recognition  of  the  records.  KNCHR  successfully
requested the establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, whose
role it would be bring up genuine legal, social and economic issues from the crisis.53 The
issues of constitutional reform and the creation of a counter authority institutionalised
by the position of Prime Minister with executive powers, returned to the forefront with
massive support.
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Subsidiary reasons for the crisis
33 It is significant that the uniting of the secular civil society with the KPTJ group did not
completely dilute the multiple causes represented by its various components. The use of a
woman’s image by the two antagonistic factions of the civil society is a case in point.
Several  times,  the  pacifists  referred  to  women  as  the  first  victims  of  postelectoral
violence, and as the main guarantors of peace. It is a procession of women that deposited
flowers and provisions at the feet of armed policemen at Uhuru Park. Groups of women
for peace were formed. The democratic civil society, however, preferred to politise the
issue. They did this by not allowing the pacifists to have the monopoly of a feminist
viewpoint and the use of a female figure. Thus, the Federation of Women Lawyers—FIDA,
accused the police of doing little to stop the harassment of female refugees in Naivasha.
Through its chairperson, Violet Awori, FIDA became part of the KNHRC committee on this
issue. The committee announced that the problem would be brought to light as soon as
order  was  re-established,  sending  the  women’s  cause  back  to  its  subsidiary.  FIDA’s
demand must not be seen in isolation from the clear ingenuity in its declaration. In the
battle for the establishment of an official representation of the conflict, the appropriation
of a specific cause through a camp is a sizeable challenge.
 
Conclusion
34 The actions of the Kenyan civil society during the 2007 elections raised several questions
that have yet to be answered. The first is that of its representation. The importance taken
by international approval in the national recognition of this civil society was evident.
Beyond the resources of the extroversion, it appears that structuring the civil society to
churches  was  a  major  factor  in  its  social  recognition.  It  also  seemed to  be  the  only
resource that could go beyond the Anglophone professional and urban framework for a
resolution of its problems. Also outstanding is the multiplicity of its organisations, in
comparison to the feeble number of the noteworthy individuals of this civil society. The
tide of acronyms that accompany every political failure, notwithstanding, going by press
articles, the true forces remain very few. Therefore, it can ironically be stated that at the
beginning of the 1990s, the civil society in Kenya comprised 30 people spread out in 60
organisations.54 Things do not seem to be much different today, where NGOs often appear
to be no more than names borrowed by individuals with NGOs multiplying in tandem
with their militant identities. The plethora of organisations is often represented by the
same individual actors.
35 Finally, the issue of the civil society’s representation of human rights seems to be much
more important as it is separated from the militarized and vernacular sphere of influence
operational in rural and urban areas. These latter do not seem to be captured by political
negotiations at the higher echelons of human rights associations have no common forum
with the militia,  or even with local  organisations who made distribution of land and
economic  resources  their  raison  d’être.  This  leads  to  the  issue  of  the  civil  society’s
independence  vis-à-vis  the  positions  taken  by  the  political  parties.  The  deep  split
apparent in Kenya today produces a situation where the civil society plays a de facto role
of the opposition. Fighting against the possibility of a democratic alternative, it still acts
as an opposition whose aim is not so much respect for political plurality as access to
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power. This was clear displayed by the civil society rallying behind M. Kibaki and his
dashed hopes in 2002.
36 Ultimately, it would be worthwhile to recapture the terms of an analysis made ten years
ago by H. Maupeu and J. Lafargue.55 On the eve of the 1997 General Elections won by Moi,
the two researchers bitterly acknowledged the existence of a civil society that, despite its
organisation and plurality, turned out to be incapable of overthrowing a regime that had
become  unpopular.  This  echoed  E.  Gellner’s  thought,56 who  posited  that  the
contemporary civil society found its strength in economic growth and civic duty, arguing
that  although  these  components  had  been  well  presented  within  the  organisations
studied,  their  projects  were  too  radical  and  contradictory  to  be  operational.  This
statement  still  holds  water  today.  The  projects  of  the  churches  and  human  rights
organisations  were  shown  to  be  divergent  during  the  crisis,  while  their  de  facto
respective convictions led to partisan support. Although these were certainly sensible
points  of  view,  they  were  opposed  to  each  other.  Beyond  this  basically  conjectural
assessment, it should also be noted that the civic duty advocated by the organisations was
strongly damaged by the unequal redistribution of the fruit of economic growth in the
past five years. Rather than strengthening the rules and institutions of democracy, one
could hypothesise that these economic inequalities emphasized the local and imaginary
conflictual  ethnic  identities.  The huge geographic  polarisation of  the election results
tends to confirm this. From the moment that the voting results were declared as having
been rigged by the governmental team, the civic lessons offered by the associations have
had little value. Although the revolt during the first days was undoubtedly guided by the
feeling  of  a  rigged  election  resulting  from  popular  domestication  of  democratic
standards, these were possibly only for the losers of the day. For a short while, they ceded
to a collective imagination of exit from the crisis based on evictions and “each to his own.”
This former, a product of a very radical interpretation of majimbo, was carried out by
militia who to date have not been disarmed, despite a fortunate cessation of the tensions.
The events at the beginning of 2008 therefore show the fragility of the human rights civil
society, of its ideals and its victories. The standards that the associations still had, from
an operational point of view, are still  merely a body of negotiable norms in terms of
current partisan interests.  Whereas the exit from the crisis is a reason for optimism,
statements by the authorities, and especially the weaknesses of the civil society, are not
very different from what was ten years ago.
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NOTES
1. For a more complete history of this expresion’s various definitions, see F. Rangeon,
1986.
2. See the article by Hervé Maupeu, ‘The role of religious institutions,’ in this volume.
3. Mainly The Daily Nation and The Standard.
4. For more on the debates summarized here that animated the 4C’s from 1994 to 1997,
see R.-M. Peters, 2001.
5. The former single party, Kenya Africa National Union, which had been in power from
independance upto 2002.
6. These  were  the  churches,  albeit  with large  divisions  between the  evangelical  and
fundamentalist Protestants, often loyal to the political power under Moi, and the ‘liberal’
Catholic and Anglican churches. The latter radicalised their message in the 1990s during
several  traumatic  events—the  assasination  of  Robert  Ouko,  the  minister  for  Foreign
Affairs, the violent repression of the “Saba Saba” riots, and the first ‘ethnic cleansings’
organised by the authorities in Rift Valley. These events led the Catholic and Anglican
churches to more openly oppose the head of state and to legitimise its position. This
entry into politics was a very big step in the constitution-making process in Kenya’s civil
society  as  it  is  owed to  the  churches,  right  from the  1992  elections,  the  intial  civic
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education programmes aimed at sensitizing the masses about multipartyism. However,
despite  being  accustomed  to  working  together  within  an  ecumenical  dialogue,  the
churches  hav  always  hads  difficulties  in  maintaining  a  united  front  during  electoral
periods. For more on this subject, refer to H. Maupeu, 1997.
7. Through the National Council of Churches of Kenya, the ecumenical meeting of the
‘liberal’ Protestant churches of Kenya.
8. A detailed description of these demonstrations and of their emergence conditions is
given in R.-M. Peters, 2001.
9. C. Thomas, 1997.
10. A. Oloo, 2007 ; R.-M. Peters, 2001.
11. H. Maupeu, 2004.
12. A coalition of poltical parties created to knock down the regime of D. arap Moi during
the 2002 General Elections in which M. Kibaki was the candidate.
13. H. Maupeu, 2003.
14. All from the Democratic Party (DP).
15. National Democratic Party, one of the constituents of the NARC coalition, along with
the declining barons of KANU and of M. Kibaki’s DP.
16. See L.W. Maina et al., 2006.
17. Examples are the initiatives of the Constitutional Reforms and Education Consulting,
Community-Based  Education  for  Development,  Citizen  Coalition  for  Constitutional
Change.
18. Constituency  Electoral  Monitoring  Project,  Kenya  Civil  Society  Referendum
Observation Program along with the Electoral Observors programme led by the Kenya
Human Rights Commission-
19. Illegal land allocation, degazettement of National Parks, among many other processes.
20. A  paramilitary  élitist  police  group,  ordinarily  charged  with  the  responsibility  of
breaking up riots.
21. The Standard, 6 November 2007.
22. M.-E. Pommerolle, 2002.
23. Co-directed by Koki Muli of Institute for Education in Democracy and Oliver Kisaka, of
the National Council of Churches of Kenya.
24. Kenya  Elections  Domestic  Observation  Forum,  ‘Preliminary  Press  Statement  and
Verdict of 2007 Kenya’s General Elections.’ 31 December 2007.
25. Along with, on behalf of the civil society, J. Melli of the Association of Professional
Societies of East Africa, B. Sihanya of the Faculty of Law at the University of Nairobi, and
H.M.  Yusuf,  of  Supreme  Council  of  Kenyan  Muslims—SUPKEM.  In  addition  to  these
representatives, two members from every political party were admitted.
26. International Crisis Group, Kenya in crisis, Africa Report, no. 137, 21 February 2008,
35 p.
27. ‘Interview with Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat.’ Wajibu, a Journal of Social and Religious
Concerns,  Issue  17,  [On  line]  URL:  http://africa.peacelink.org/wajibu/articles/
art_2122.html [archive].
28. The Standard, 5 February 2008.
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29. The Standard, 1 February 2008.
30. For example the Kenya Private Sector Alliance, The Standard, 20 January 2008.
31. The Standard, 21 and 24 January 2008.
32. An advertisment by the Anglican Church of Kenya, the Methodist Church of Kenya,
the  Kenya  Broadasting  Corporation  (public  television  channel)  and  Equity  Bank,
‘Restoring Hope Together,’ published in The Standard, 18 January 2008.
33. The Daily Nation, 10 February 2008.
34. The Standard, 27 January 2008.
35. ‘Countdown to deception: 30 hours that destroyed Kenya.’ Kenyans for Peace with
Truth and Justice, January 2008.
36. Reuters, 31 December 2007.
37. This was done in a memorandum addressed to President M. Kibaki in March 2007.
38. Kenya Human Rights Institute, Special Brief: Civil Society Responses to the Kenyan Crisis,
February 2008.
39. Cf. International Crisis Group, op. cit.
40. The Standard, 3 January 2008.
41. The Standard, 30 January 2008.
42. Its members were involved as observors in the conflicts in Darfour, Sierra Leone,
Kosovo, East Timor Oriental, Cambodia and the Balkans. One of them even questioned the
crimes ascribed to the Nazi regime. The Standard, 5 February 2008.
43. Online  statement  by  Kenyans  for  Peace,  Truth,  Justice,  5-01-2008,  URL:  https://
www.wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/kenyans-for-peace-truth-and-justice.pdf [archive].
44. Cf. for example M. Kiai,  Discours au Congrès américain, 6-02-2008, [on-line] URL :
https://allafrica.com/stories/200802080688.html [archive]. 
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